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Abstract: 
 
The paper deals with the brain drain phenomenon (rational minds 
migration), displayed inside the European Union, in close correlation with 
European tax competition. Speciality literature from the countries of the 
European Union deals with great responsibility the migration process of the 
specialists, numerous studies being dedicated to this phenomenon. Through the 
present paper we aim to study this correlation and the evaluation of the 
implications for the member states of the European Union, by elaborating a 
model by means of which there are tested the correlations between different 
variables and the quantification of the taxation effects upon the brain drain 
phenomenon. The model is an adaptation of the so-called ”Model of the Brain 
Drain and human capital formation” elaborated by Mountford (1997) by which 
there are described the different researched variables: brain gain, brain drain, 
migration competition and tax competition. Obviously, the scenarios may be 
different from country to country depending on the different values of the two key 
factors taken into account: migration probability and considerable differences of 
technological capacity.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
The present paper aims to study the correlation between the brain drain 
phenomenon and tax competition, phenomena which, for a long time, have been 
handled and studied in a separate manner by the authors.   
Although the brain drain concepts and the tax competition are connected 
by means of the migration phenomenon, still, for a long time, the literature studied 
them separately due to the complexity of joint analysis. Therefore, a series of 
previous elaborated studies (Kurien, C.T., 1999; Robinson, Viki, 2003; Ferro, A., 
2004; Fagan, Frank, 2004; Mitchell, D, 2004; Jeff, C., 2004; Lien, Donald, 2005; 
Wildasin, D., 2005;  Pierpaolo, G., 2006) have developed two separate branches 
for the brain drain and tax competition phenomena.  
The first is focused on the brain drain phenomenon from a macroeconomic 
approach and studies its impact upon the economic raise in different analysed 
economies.  
The second analyses the tax competition from the microeconomic 
perspective, being focused on the interaction between the migration phenomenon 
and the destination states.  
Regarding the unitary handling of these two phenomena, two studies draw 
our attention in a special manner:   „Brain drain and fiscal competition. A 
theoretical model for Europe” (Pierpaolo Giannoccolo, 2006) and „Brain drain, 
fiscal competition and public education expenditure” (Hartmut Egger, Josef 
Falkinger, Volker Grossman, 2007). The authors drew the attention upon the 
danger generated by tax competition, which displays inside the community space, 
upon the migration phenomenon. The performed analyses were grounded on 
building some analysis models of the opportunities and risks generated by policy 
in the education field.   
The model presented in the paper is an adaptation of the so-called ”Model 
of the Brain Drain and Human Capital Formation” elaborated by  Mountford 
(1997), by which there are described the different researched variables: brain gain, 
brain drain, migration competition and tax competition. 
Obviously, the scenarios may be different from country to country 
depending on the different values of the two key factors taken into account: 
migration probability (π ) and considerable differences of technological capacity 
(η ).  
 
2. Concepts and definitions 
 
Brain drain or ”human capital flight“ is the emigration phenomenon of 
the educated or talented persons due to various accounts: conflicts, lack of 
opportunities, and so on. The investment in education is lost along with the 
person's departure, who usually doesn't come back in his/her country of origin. 
Within Royal Society of London the term of brain drain was used for the first time 
in order to describe the leaving of scientists and technicians for USA or Canada at 
the beginning of the 50's in the past century. The phenomenon known as brain 
drain is still present nowadays and it is also defined as a constant transfer (drain) 
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of personnel with high skills (brain) from certain countries, generally less 
developed, towards others which are more developed from the economical point 
of view, if it is taken into account the fact that main reason of the phenomenon is 
an economic one.   
Therefore, the brain drain is the part of the emigration which comprises 
the persons with high skills, universitary education.   
It arises from here that the difficulty of quantifying the phenomenon, as 
the majority of the states disposes of general statistical data concerning 
emigration, but do not dispose of distributed statistics which would quantify the 
education level of the emigrants.  
The phenomenon is associated with the “capital flight” term, which refers 
to the capital fight which is not invested in the country where its holder lives and 
where it was created. The exodus is voluntary, braked by the countries of origin 
and encouraged by the receiving countries. 
In the OECD report (1987) there are other definitions of the brain drain 
phenomenon: ”Brain drain implies a flow of specialists with two directions 
between the country which sends and the one which receives. However, the net 
flow is in a decisive manner favored in only one direction, the terms used in this 
case being ”brain gain” (benefit for the country of origin and the source country) 
or ”brain drain” (vital loss of human resource for the country of origin). A 
subsequent term ”brain waste” describes the wasting of abilities which takes place 
when the very well trained specialists migrate towards certain work places which 
don't require the abilities and experience applied to the previous work place.  
Tax competition arises because the member states of the European Union 
are in competition in order either to attract a mobile taxation basis or to reject the 
mobile taxation beneficiaries. 
Generally, the work force is less mobile than the capital and a work force 
with low skills is less mobile than a work force with high skills. As a 
consequence, the tax competition leads to an essential change regarding the 
taxation structure.  Thus, the governments of the member states are forced to 
reduce the taxation level for the factors having a high mobility and to increase the 
tax burden on less mobile sources, in order to protect the revenues. If there is a tax 
competition, the tax rates shall move, as a consequence, from the corporate 
revenues to the personal ones, from the capital revenues to the ones from the work 
force, from the high revenue to the low one generated by the work force and 
generally from the revenues and welfare taxation to consumption's taxation.      
The main results of the evolution of taxation level within the European 
Union during the last decades confirm exactly the fact that this thing happened.  
Therefore, the UN report (2001) proposed the establishment of a global 
system of taxation of emigrants, but which violates the civil rights of citizens. The 
proposal was justified by the fact that the source country (that sends) is subject to 
some major economic losses if the majority of trained individuals migrate. This 
issue is quite sensitive, because the concept of "brain drain” indicates the most 
sensitive form of technology transfer – that of the human professional capital. 
Concerning the citizens of the European Union, these choose their 
residence in a state which would offer them an optimal combination between the 
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tax burden and the public assets of which they can take advantage for free. In the 
context of the European Union, the mobility of the citizens is free of any kind of 
institutional constraints so that the cultural integration increases the probability of 
migrating within the Union. Especially for that reason, the flow of specialists 
reached a relevant position in the research agenda of the European Union.  
As a consequence, studying the brain drain phenomenon is closely 
connected to the election of the specialists' education. If public education is good, 
the skilled specialists may migrate, and as a secondary effect, the tax competition 
is accentuating. Moreover, if the governments of the member states don't 
coordinate the taxation systems and the quality of public services (teaching 
system, especially), a series of negative economic effects may arise up to the 
standard of the states.   
In this context, it is necessary to redefine the brain drain phenomenon  up 
to the standard of the member states of the European Union, as the tax 
competition may be used as a ”new tool of public interest” (Pierpaolo 
Giannoccolo, 2007). Furthermore, when the expanded European Union is 
analyzed, two types of states may be distinguished: old states, with a powerful 
economic development and the new member states, with less solid economies and 
low productivity. Implicitly, the old member states may compete to one another in 
order to attract skilled specialists which belong to the countries in Central Europe 
and Eastern Europe, thus arising the ”migration competition” phenomenon.  
 
3. Model description  
  
  The model represents a more simple version of the Brain drain model and 
Mountford’s human capital formation (1997). Through the model, we study the 
specific case of the European Union in which the mobility of the specialists is 
freely allowed, in order to identify the possible negative effect generated by the 
interaction between the tax competition and brain drain phenomenon. 
The model analyses an opened economy, with only one good product 
constantly analyzed by means of work efficiency unit (L): Yt= XtLt. We suppose 
that the education decision is each person's free will, and the citizens of each state 
may choose to be educated or not. At the same time, we suppose that the rate of 
the wage on work efficiency units is independent of the work force in time t and 
independent of work productivity or technology level λt, which is given: wt=λtw. 
Concerning the distribution of abilities, the persons own different latent 
ability models, where e to t indicate the latent ability of person i. We suppose that 
all generations have latent abilities which are chosen from the same distribution 
and that the children's abilities are independent of their parents' abilities. 
  Education. We suppose that all citizens have the same preferences and 
access to the same technology, although they don't have the same latent ability 
levels. 
  The citizens who invest in education obtain e to t work efficiency units, 
where e to t is the latent ability level of the agent i. Furthermore, let's suppose that 
the citizens who don't invest in education have a single work efficiency unit and 
that the costs of education may be settled to c exit units 
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  The government shall influence the education decisions of the citizens by 
taxing the skilled ones, covering a part of their education costs. Thus, by granting 
the subventions for education, the education cost becomes c-γt, where γt is the 
subvention for education.  
  Let's define Tt as the marginal rate of the specialists' taxes in t generation. 
Introducing the tax, the wage rate for the work efficiency unit becomes:  
)1( t
i
t
i
t Twew −= λ  
Migration (π ). Let's suppose that emigration is allowed only for the 
specialists (skilled persoans). Let's suppose that the probability of a successful 
emigration for the skilled citizens born in J country, Jπ , is independent of the 
number of potential citizens for emigration. Let's suppose that the emigration 
policy is completely anticipated. 
At the same time, we suppose that in the model there aren't mobility costs, 
so that the skilled specialists decide if they migrate or not, as an answer to the 
different wages which they receive. Their future wage is connected to the taxing 
policy of the states and to the difference of technology between countries. 
Therefore, the skilled citizens shall rather stay in the J country if: 
titj TT ,, )1( ηη −+≤ , 
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j
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a
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and I is the country which offers to the skilled specialists a better wage.    
So, we may differentiate three different stages: 
Case (1): all educated persons wish to migrate in the J region:  
I
t
J
t TT )1( ηη −+〈  
Case (2): all educated persons wish to migrate in the I region:  
I
t
J
t TT )1( ηη −+〉  
Case (3): is not migration:  
I
t
J
t TT )1( ηη −+=  
 
4. Brain drain or brain gain? 
 
As we have shown above, the brain drain phenomenon represents the 
specialists' migration from a country to another, without the source country having 
any benefit of it.  The brain gain phenomenon arises also from the bidirectional 
movement between the member states, but here there is a benefit from the 
emigration. Thus, in order to better understand the role of emigration in the 
raising and development of the member states, it is necessary to perform an 
analysis from which to grow out the existence or voidness of the situations when 
the emigration increases the number of specialists in both states (bidirectional 
movement), thus increasing the development of the states. Bellow we shall 
analyze only the first case previously presented and namely the case in which all 
specialists wish to migrate in the J country. 
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Case (1):  It
J
t TT )1( ηη −+〈 :  all skilled persons wish to migrate in the J 
country.  
But the J country doesn't lose its specialists and attracts only the skilled 
ones from other countries. Therefore, in order to analyze the possibility of the 
”benefit” from emigration (Brain gain) we study the countries from which they 
come from.  
The medium proportion of the skilled persons in the economy I is given by 
the following equation: 
∫
∫
−
−= E
e
i
I
iiE
eI
tI
tI
tI
deeg
deeg
s
,
,
)(1
)()1(
, π
π
 
If π = 1 then the source economy loses all its specialists and 0=NtS .  
If π  = 0 then inside the union the emigration doesn't exist. Therefore, an 
adequate condition for the existence of a positive level of specialists' transfer so 
that the economy to take advantage concerning the productivity is that 0, 〉πd
ds tI  
when π  = 0. The optimum level of π   shall be given when 0, =πd
ds tI .  
Thus, if there are big wage differences on the productivity of the work unit 
and there is a defective mobility of the skilled specialists then a positive optimum 
level of emigration arises if  AtItI TT ,,0 ≤〈  
As a consequence, the source economy may take advantage of the brain 
drain if there are an adequate number of persons who would invest in education. 
Going further with the correlations, the tax competition displayed by taxation and 
education valorization implies two different results. Therefore, the successive 
taxation of the work force reduces a lot the probability that the new-comers to be 
under ”optimal brain drain” conditions. On the other hand, the taxes increase the 
wage differences between the entrance country and the others and thus it increases 
the possibility of gaining from the brain drain, exclusive benefit for the 
destination country.  
 
5. Romania's Case  
 
Presently, the number of researchers in Romania is in a continuous 
decline. If in the year 1989 in Romania worked more than 150,000 researchers, in 
the year 2006 the official statistics recorded only 36,863 employees in research 
(Diagram 1).  
According to data provided by Eurostat, the percentage of the labor force 
represented by researchers in 2001 was of 0.39% in Romania, the penultimate on 
the European level, compared with an average of 1.39% in the European Union. 
The number of certified researchers was in 2002 of 8513 people, and the number 
of researchers in Romania who published in scientific journals from the main 
scientific flow (indexed by ISI) was estimated at 5700, so only about 15% of the 
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people working in the research field and 67% of the certified researchers were 
competitive researchers at the international level. 
The decrease of the number of researchers in Romania can be explained 
both by their diversion to other sectors, and by the fact that many researchers and 
young people who wish to pursue a scientific career choose the emigration path, 
the gain for the source  country being ineffective (we are clearly in the situation of 
brain drain).   
A careful analysis of the impact of tax competition on the taxation of the 
qualified labor force in Romania shows that young people who choose to study 
abroad are more and more and many of them choose to work after completing 
their studies also abroad. This is because the developed countries offer to young 
people the warranty of success, but also the prospect of higher material earnings, 
compared to those that could be obtained in the country of origin, under an 
optimal tax pressure. In 2006, those aged 26-40 years who emigrated from 
Romania accounted for 58.1% of the total, compared to 38.8% in 2000 (Mariana 
Vuţă, Paula Lazăr, 2007). 
There must be emphasized that the receiving country benefits, therefore, 
from the effect of brain capitalization, while the country of origin recorded a brain 
drain and hence a reduction of the added value that could lead to the growth and 
development of society.  
In Romania, of the approximately 9500 foreign students who study at 
universities, only 1500 grow from the countries of the European Union - 25, the 
rest growing from countries such as the Republic of Moldavia, Israel, Turkey, 
Albania. In comparison, the Czech Republic imported twice more intelligence 
than exported annually, and Hungary with 60% more. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Brain Gain. When the J country is less productive than the I country and 
the probability of emigration π  is low, it means that we find ourselves in the 
scenario described by Mauntford (1997).  
Thus, the specialists' migration may raise the productivity and the medium 
equality in the source economy (brain gain). In the European context, this scenario 
may be possible when the new-comer of the European Union is less productive 
than the first (but without existing major differences). In this scenario, the optimal 
policy of the European Union's institutions is to take no action. 
Brain Drain. The differences between countries are so big that the 
country with the highest productivity attracts in a unilateral manner the specialists 
from other countries. This scenario is usually studied by speciality literature, 
which often refers to the unidirectional flow of the over-skilled work force from 
the less developed countries. This literature explained the human capital flight as 
being a ”negative taxation externality” due to immigration. The possibility that the 
welfare of those who remain in the less developed countries to be reduced by the 
exodus of the skilled persons was also acknowledged in literature.    
From the paper of Grubel and Scott, Berry and Soligo and Harry Johnson 
in the 60's, the main conclusion was that the welfare of those who didn't emigrate 
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should decrease only if the contribution of the emigrants to the national 
production was higher than their income. In this scenario (in which our country is 
included also) the optimal policy of the European Union's institutions is to 
introduce a “tax on brain drain” in order to compensate the permanent loss of 
human resource for the source country. 
Emigration competition. In this case the states don't have major 
productivity differences and compete attracting the skilled specialists (emigration 
competitions), usually from the countries less developed from the economic point 
of view. The main directions by means of which the specialists may be attracted 
could be summarized as it follows:  
- building a more opened and flexible academic system; 
- improving the regulatory  conditions, especially upon immigration;  
- a better information up to the national standard; 
- promoting on a large scale of the scholarships for the foreign researchers;  
- homogenizing the wage incomes for similar trainings on the work force 
market;   
- reducing the taxes, especially for the researchers and intellectuals;  
- promoting a more active international marketing and support for the 
international researchers.  
Tax competition. The emigration probability is high (or very close) and 
the countries have the same productivity (or almost the same). In this case, the 
possibility that all skilled specialists to leave suggests the adjustment of 
investments in education.  
In the European context, this scenario is possible within the first member 
states of the European Union. In this scenario, the optimal policy of the European 
Union's institutions is to coordinate all member states and to define a common 
line regarding the investments in education and research.  
In what Romania is concerned, the phenomenon of migration of brains 
(brain drain), particularly of those well prepared, is obvious. This is because, on 
the one hand, of the very low wages that well prepared individuals obtain in the 
country and on the other hand, the much better conditions of employment that are 
offered in most member countries of the Union.  
Another aspect to be highlighted is that which refers to the fact that, 
although after 2004 the taxation of the revenues from wages is achieved by 
applying a proportionate percentage quota of 16%, the social contributions still 
have a very high value. This is also ascertained at the taxpayers legal persons, 
where the Romanian government practices also a quota of 16% for the taxation of 
the obtained profit.  
On a short-term, there is ascertained an increase of the foreign investments 
in Romania, but on the long-term the effects of tax competition will be felt, as the 
qualified labor force prefers to work abroad, without certain advantages for the 
source economy. 
 Starting from those presented in the paper, we appreciate that the effects of 
the brain drain phenomenon upon the countries of the European Union have a 
different amplitude, stressing the differences existing between the developed and 
developing countries. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1: The evolution of the number of researchers in Romania  
during 1992-2006  
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Source: The Statistical Yearbook of Romania, 2006   
 
 
 
